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COMMENTS
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SUCCESSORSHIP
TO THE PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES
Labor is prior to, and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruits of
labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor
is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration.'
Privatization refers to the transfer of governmental assets, including
labor, from the government to a private party.2 Increasingly, it is advocated
as a way to "downsize" the government by reducing costs while increasing
productivity.3 Inherent in this concept is the belief that private firms are
more efficient than public bureaucracy, supposedly because they are
motivated by profit, rather than the incentive of public service.4
Privatization is being proposed on the federal, state and local levels, and
its support seems to be growing. Currently, there are six bills before
Congress providing for privatization of various services, from the Post Office
to the Tennessee Valley Water Authority.5 In 1987, President Reagan
established a President's Commission on Privatization to identify which
federal functions should be transferred to the private sector.6 President
Clinton has expanded the concept and actively promotes the efforts of state
and local governments to transfer infrastructure assets to the private sector.7
1. Abraham Lincoln, in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 499 (1993).
2. Exec. Order No. 12,803, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,063 (1992).
3. E.S. SAVAS, THE PUBLIC SECTOR: HOW TO SHRINK GOVERNMENT (Aaron Wildavsky
ed. 1982).
4. Milton Friedman, The Role of Incentive in Private Behavior, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1,
3 (1992).
5. H.R. 210, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (provides for the privatization of the United
States Postal Service); H.R. 313, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (directs the President to develop
a plan for transferring all real property, facilities and equipment of the Tennessee Valley
Authority to public and private entities); H.R. 28, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) (Freedom From
Government Competition Act requires the federal government to procure from the private sector
the goods and services necessary for the operation and management of certain government
agencies); H.R. 209, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (amends the National Foundation on the Arts
and the Humanities Act of 1965 to abolish the National Endowment for the Arts and National
Council of the Arts); H.R. 310, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (provides for the privatization of
the Federal Power Marketing Administrations); and H.R. 579, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(amends the National Foundation on the Humanities and the Humanities Act of 1965 to abolish
the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Council on the Humanities).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,607, 53 Fed. Reg. 34,190 (1987).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,803, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,063 (1992) Infrastructure assets are defined
as any assets financed at least partially by the federal government. Id. They include: roads,
tunnels, bridges, electricity facilities, mass transit, railroads, airports, ports, waterways, water
supply facilities, recycling and wastewater treatment facilities, solid waste disposal facilities,
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Government employees performing public functions are often covered by
collective bargaining agreements, and the number of unionized government
workers is growing. Union membership in general was in a state of decline
for fourteen years until 1994.8 The new growth in union membership is
attributed to the increase in the number of unionized government workers. 9
While most unionized workers in the private sector are covered by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),'0 federal, state and local government
employees are specifically excluded." The NLRA, enacted in 1935, declared
it to be the policy of the United States to encourage collective bargaining.' 2
The Act gives employees the right to organize and bargain collectively and
establishes the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to regulate union
activities.' 3 Additionally, the NLRB is given the power to enforce and
remedy unfair labor practices.' 4 In contrast, government employees' rights
are controlled by state and federal public employee labor policies. Because
of the different statutes involved, labor relations in the public sector may
differ from those in private industry'6 and may also differ from state to state.
Proponents of privatization presume that formerly public employees
working in the private sector will not remain organized. 7 Privatization,
therefore, is seen as one way to eliminate or reduce the overall numbers of
housing, schools, prisons and hospitals. Id.
8. Susan L. Behrmann, U.S. Dept. Of Labor, Union Members in 1993, 46 COMPENSATION
AND WORKING CoNDmoNS 2 (Feb. 1994).
9. Id. In California, a 1987 survey showed government employees produced the largest gain
in unionization and represented the largest number of unionized workers. 1989 Union Labor in
California, 1987, CALIF DEPT. OF INDUS. REL.
10. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (1988).
11. 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2) (1988).
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly
or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone
acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
Id.
12. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1988).
13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (1988).
14. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1988).
15. Eric J. Pelton, Note, Privatization of the Public Sector: A Look at Which Labor Laws
Should Apply to Private Firms Contracted to Perform Public Services, 1986 DE'. C.L. REv. 805,
808. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 covers federal public employees. See 5 U.S.C.A§§ 1101-1501 (1994). State and municipal workers are covered by state labor laws.
16. MORRIS A. HOROWVITZ, COLLECIIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECrOR I (John T.
Dunlop & Arnold M. Zack, eds. 1994). A major difference between collective bargaining in the
private and public sector is the right to strike. Id. Only ten states have granted public employees
the right to strike: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Vermont and Wisconsin. Id. Other differences include scope of bargaining, grievance
procedures, bargaining unit size and grouping, and wage determination. Id. at 5-13.
17. Craig Becker, With Whose Hands: Privatization, Public Employment and Democracy,
6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 88, 89 (1988).
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organized workers.'" Opponents of privatization, however, see it as a labor
relations strategy designed to cut labor costs at the expense of public
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 9
Under the doctrine of successorship, 0 when a new employer takes over
a unionized business and certain conditions are met, the new employer may
be considered a successor employer and thus may inherit certain obligations
of the former employer. The term "successor employer" is imposed by the
NLRB and generally denotes a private employer who has assumed a business
from a private predecessor.2'
The United States Supreme Court has held that this doctrine requires a
successor employer to bargain with the union representing the displaced
employees when there is a "substantial continuity" between the businesses. 22
One of the purposes of successorship law is to protect employees from
uncertainty when business ownership is transferred in order to promote the
ultimate goal of the NLRA: industrial peace.3 One legal question that
remains unanswered is whether successorship applies when privatization
occurs, that is, when a governmental entity employing union workers is
turned over to a private business. This Comment will discuss the doctrine
of successorship in light of the current trend of privatization.
Section I of this Comment will review the background of the National
Labor Relations Act and the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of
successorship and collective bargaining. Section II will discuss current legal
trends by analyzing NLRB cases and conclude that successorship will apply
when a public employee becomes a private employee through privatization.
Section Im will briefly discuss some of the societal benefits associated with
union organization and collective bargaining. Finally, this Comment will
argue that its application is in the best interests of not only the employee, but
society as a whole.
I. BACKGROUND
A. National Labor Relations Act
18. Id. at 90 (citing HARRY WELLINGTON & RALPH WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES
62-65 (1971)).
19. Id. at 88.
20. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); Howard Johnson
Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417
U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
21. B. Glenn George, Successorship andthe Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277,
277 (1988).
22. Fall River, 482 U.S. 27; Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. 249; Burns, 406 U.S. 272; Wiley,
376 U.S. 543.
23. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 38.
1995]
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The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935.24 In an effort to
promote industrial peace, it encouraged collective bargaining by giving
employees the right of self-organization.' It allows workers to form or join
a labor union and outlines the procedure for union certification.26 Once a
union has been certified, under subsection 8(a)(5) of the Act, it becomes an
unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
employee representatives.27 Likewise, the labor organization itself has a duty
to bargain with the employer.' The Act, however, does not expressly
impose the duty to bargain in cases where a formally unionized business is
sold or transferred to a non-union or different union company. The duty of
a successor employer to bargain with a predecessor union has evolved from
NLRB decisions and the federal courts. Underlying this duty is the
assumption that industrial peace will be maintained as long as the employees'
reasonable expectations are carried out.29
The term "successor employer" usually denotes an employer who has
purchased or assumed a business.3" A successor employer may obtain a
business through "merger, sale of stock, sale of assets, loss of a renewable
contract, incorporation of a formerly unincorporated entity, dissolution of a
corporation, bankruptcy" or other means.3  While a private business
purchasing or assuming a government service has yet to be called a
"successor employer," the above definition of the term perhaps is broad
enough to include it.
B. Supreme Court Treatment of Successorship Cases
1. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston
The issue of successorship was first addressed by the Supreme Court in
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.32 In Wiley, the Court held that the
rights of employees under a collective bargaining agreement are not
automatically lost after a company's merger, and a successor employer may
be required to arbitrate under the agreement.33 In Wiley, the predecessor
employer, Interscience, had merged with the successor, Wiley, and was no
24. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (1988).
25. Id.
26. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (1988).
27. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
28. Id. at § 158(b)(3) (1988).
29. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973).
30. George, supra note 21, at 277.
31. Jonathan Silver, Reflections on the Obligations of a Successor Employer, 2 CARDozo
L. REv. 545, 545 n.1 (1981).
32. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
33. Id. at 548.
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longer in business as a separate entity.34 After the merger, all but a few of
Interscience's employees were retained by Wiley.
The dispute arose when Wiley refused to recognize the union and
asserted that the merger terminated the bargaining agreement, which
contained an arbitration provision." Wiley contended that the union lost its
bargaining status when the Interscience unionized employees were merged
with the Wiley non-unionized employees .3  Thus, it would not have to honor
seniority provisions and pension fund payments provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement and it was not obligated to arbitrate.
The union based its claim on a state law and argued that Wiley was a
successor to Interscience and thus bound by the collective bargaining
agreement. 9 In the alternative, the union claimed that federal policy and
federal law mandated arbitration.4
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Wiley's argument and required
the company to comply with the arbitration provision in its predecessor's
labor agreement. In affirming Wiley's obligation to arbitrate, the Court
relied, in part, on the important role of arbitration in effectuating national
labor policy.4' The Court reasoned that since employees and their unions
usually do not have a voice in corporate ownership negotiations, the well-
being of the employees may become incidental to the considerations of the
34. Id. at 545. At the time of the merger, Interscience had eighty employees, forty of whom
were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. None of Wiley's three hundred employees
were unionized. Id.
35. Id. at 545-46.
36. Id. at 545.
37. Id. at 547. Wiley argued that it was never a party to the collective bargaining agreement
and could not be bound to an agreement it did not sign. Id. Thus it was not bound to arbitrate
and not bound to the previous collective bargaining agreement provisions. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 547-548. N.Y. Stock Corporation Law § 90 reads in part:
The rights of creditors of any constituent corporation shall not in any manner be
impaired, nor shall any liability or obligation due or to become due, or any claim or
demand for any cause existing against any such corporation or against any stockholder
thereof be released or impaired by any such consolidation; but such consolidated
corporation shall be deemed to have assumed and shall be liable for all liabilities and
obligations of each of the corporations consolidated in the same manner as if such
consolidated corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations.
Id. at 548 n.2.
40. Id. at 548.
41. Id. at 549. The Court further recognized the central role of arbitration in effectuating
national labor policy. "It would derogate from 'the federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitration,' if a change in the corporate structure or ownership of a business enterprise had the
automatic consequence of removing a duty to arbitrate previously established." Id. (citation
omitted). Arbitration is seen "as the substitute for industrial strife" and as "part and parcel of
the collective bargaining process itself." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 596 (1960).
5
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negotiators.42 Arbitration was seen as a method to "level the playing field"
thereby easing the transition and avoiding industrial strife. 3 This national
labor policy preference for arbitration could only be overcome by compelling
circumstances, which Wiley did not show.'
Moreover, the Wiley Court characterized a collective bargaining
agreement as a new common law, dictated by the NLRA and circum-
stance.45 A collective bargaining agreement is more complex than an
ordinary contract because it covers the entire employment relationship and
governs many circumstances which cannot be anticipated.' Therefore,
although the duty to arbitrate was contractually based, the Court did not
apply ordinary contract principles and instead construed the obligation to
arbitrate in the context of the national labor policy.47
With this in mind, the Court considered Wiley a successor employer
because its operations were similar to those of Interscience and were
continuous with them.4" The fact that Interscience employees were a
minority in Wiley's business was not relevant.49 Instead the Court focused
on the fact that there was a "wholesale transfer" of employees to Wiley.'
The implications of this decision were broad in that it potentially created
substantial labor obligations for successor employers. 51 However, this would
occur only if they hired nearly all of the predecessor's employees and if there
was a substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise. 2
42. Id. The rights of ovmers to rearrange their businesses must be balanced against the need
for some protection for employees against sudden change in their employment relationship. Id.
43. Id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960).
44. Id. at 549-50. However, the Court stressed that the duty to arbitrate may not survive
in every case in which the ownership or corporate structure of a business is changed. Id. at 557.
For example, if there is a lack of substantial continuity of the business enterprise or the union
might fail to make its claims known. Id.
45. Id. at 550 (citing United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 580).
46. Id. Under contract law, an unconsenting successor would not be bound to the
predecessor's agreement Id.
47. Id. at 550-5 1.
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id. at 551 n.5 ("The fact that the Union does not represent a majority of an appropriate
bargaining unit in Wiley does not prevent it from representing those employees who are covered
by the agreement which is in dispute and out of which Wiley's duty to arbitrate arises.") (citing
Retail Clerks Int'l Assn., Local Unions Nos. 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17
(1962)).
50. Id. at 551.
51. George, supra note 21, at 282.
52. Susan Frier, Note, Labor Law: Expansion of the Successorship Doctrine: Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB., 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 549, 555 (1988).
[Vol. 32
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2. NLRB v. Burns International Security Systems, Inc.
Following Wiley, legal commentators predicted that because of the
Court's primary concern with protection of employee rights as a means of
maintaining industrial peace, it would eventually rule that a successor
employer would be bound by all provisions in a predecessor's labor
agreement."3 This did not happen. Eight years later, the Court, in NLRB v,
Burns International Security Systems, Inc., limited Wiley to its facts and held
that a successor could not be required to assume its predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement. 4
In Burns, Wackenhut Corp provided plant protection services to
Lockheed Aircraft Service Company. 5 United Plant Guard Workers of
America (UPGWA) was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative
for Wackenhut's employees a few months before their company's contract
expired. 6 Burns International Security Service (Burns) was the successful
bidder for the contract and took over the security service, employing forty-
two guards, of whom twenty-seven were former Wackenhut employees.'
Although Bums knew of Wackenhut's labor agreement, it refused to
recognize and bargain with the union. 8 UPGWA filed suit, demanding that
Bums recognize them and honor the collective bargaining agreement between
it and Wackenhut. 9
The Board relied on Wiley and ruled not only that Bums had a duty to
recognize and bargain with the UPGWA, but that it was bound to the terms
of the labor agreement60 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's finding
of a duty to bargain, but held that the Board could not order Burns to honor
53. Marion Crain-Mountney, Comment, The Unenforceable Successorship Clause: A
Departure From National Labor Policy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1249, 1259 (1983).
54. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
55. Id. at 274.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 274-75. On February 28, 1967, in a Board election, a majority of Wackenhut
guards selected the union as their exclusive bargaining representative. Id. at 274. On March 8,
1967, the Regional Director certified the union and on April 29, 1967, Wackenhut and the union
entered into a three year collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 274-75. On May 31, 1967,
Wackenhut vas notified that Bums would take over protection services. Id. at 275.
58. Id. Bums preferred to recognize another union which already represented guards at their
other plants.
59. Id. at 275-76.
60. Id. at 276. Note 2 quotes the Board:
The question before us thus narrows to whether the national labor policy embodied
in the Act requires the successor-employer to take over and honor a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise by the
predecessor. We hold that, absent unusual circumstances, the Act imposes such an
obligation.
Id. at 276 n.2.
1995]
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the contract executed by Wackenhut. 61 The Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeals in a five to four decision. 62
The Court recognized two factors in the determination of successorship:
(1) whether a majority of the employees hired by the new employer had
previously worked for the predecessor and (2) whether they had recently
voted in favor of union representation. 6  Bums' obligation to bargain with
UPGWA stemmed from its hiring of Wackenhut's employees, knowing of
their representation, and from the recent election and Board certification.' 4
Mere change in employers or ownership would not affect the force of Board
certification if a majority of employees after the change were employed by
the previous employer.'
The Court distinguished this case from Wiley on several grounds. First,
Wiley was an action to compel arbitration under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) and reflected the LMRA's special
concern with arbitration.' The Court reasoned that the Wiley decision was
limited only to arbitration agreements and did not extend to other provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement. However, this distinction seems weak
because it is based on the technicality of procedure alone, thereby allowing
differing results depending on the forum selected.67
Second, the Court held Wiley inapplicable because it relied heavily on
the strong public policy favoring arbitration, which was not a factor in
Burns.68 However, this rationale has been criticized because the Court in
Wiley viewed the labor agreement, and not the arbitration agreement, as the
61. Id. at 276.
62. Id. at 292. Chief Justice Rehnquist and three other justices joined in a partial dissent
and opposed the imposition of the bargaining order. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
According to Rehnquist, there was no evidence indicating that all of the twenty-seven Wackenhut
employees hired by Bums had supported the union. Id. at 297. Furthermore, the majority had
imposed on Bums the duty not only to bargain with the Wackenhut employees' union, but it also
had an obligation to bargain with another union certified by guards at its other facilities. Id. at
298. Rehnquist would have only imposed the duty to bargain when the successor had acquired
some of the predecessor's assets. Id. at 305.
63. Id. at 277-81.
64. Id. at 278-79.
65. Id. at 279. The Court compares this to § 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, which states that there
shall be no election if a valid election has been held in the preceding 12 month period. 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988). Where an employer remains the same, Board certification assumes
a presumption of majority representation status for a reasonable period of time, usually a year
after election. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954). After one year, there is a
rebuttable presumption of majority representation. See Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B.
664, 672 (1951). An almost complete turnover of employees, however, can be a basis of a
challenge to certification. Burns, 406 U.S. at 278 n.3.
66. Id. at 286. Burns was an unfair labor practice proceeding under the NLRA. Id. at 285.
67. Crain-Mountney, supra note 53, at 1262.
68. Burns, 406 U.S. at 286.
[Vol. 32
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set of rules to preserve industrial peace.69 It was the collective bargaining
agreement in Wiley which was given special status.7
Third, the Court reasoned that Wiley was decided against a background
of state law requiring that in merger situations, the surviving corporation
would be liable for the obligations of the previous corporation.7 Here, there
was no merger or sale of assets, only competitive bidding for the service
contract. Since there was no purchase of Wackenhut by Burns, it could not
be held liable for its financial obligations.' This distinction, too appears
weak because the Court in Wiley expressly stated that its decision was
controlled by federal, not state law,7 thus further undermining the Burns
distinction.
3. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB
One year later, the Court addressed a successor employer's duty to
remedy the unfair labor practice of its predecessor in Golden State Bottling
Co. v. NLRB. 4 Golden State was sold to All American Beverages after the
NLRB had ordered it to reinstate with backpay an employee whose discharge
was found to be an unfair labor practice.75 All American and Golden State
were both parties to the proceedings and both were held jointly liable.76 The
Board had found that since All American had acquired the business with
knowledge of the Board order, as the purchaser of Golden State, it was a
successor and thereby liable for the unfair labor practice.77
The Supreme Court focused its decision on successorship from the
perspective of the employees. 7 The Court stated that "when a new employer
... has acquired substantial assets of its predecessor and continued, without
interruption or substantial change, the predecessor's business operations,
those employees who have been retained will understandably view their job
situations as essentially unaltered. ' 79  The Court reasoned that if the
successor was not held liable for the predecessor's unfair labor practice, the
employees might consider the failure to remedy as a continuation of the
69. Crain-Mountney, supra note 53, at 1262.
70. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
71. Burns, 406 U.S. at 286.
72. Id.
73. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548. See also Crain-Mountney, supra note 53, at 1263.
74. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
75. Id. at 170.
76. Id. The Board, in its decision, found that Golden State violated §§ 8(a)(3), (1) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (1) (1988), when they discharged an employee because of union
activities. The employee was ordered reinstated with backpay. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 171
n.1.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 184.
79. Id.
9
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predecessor's labor policies."a Since employees have the legitimate
expectation that unfair labor practices will be remedied, the failure to do so
may result in labor unrest."1 Furthermore, there were no underlying policy
reasons for not imposing the duty to remedy.u2
4. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd.
The following term, the Supreme Court again faced the problem of
defining the labor law obligations of a successor employer in Howard
Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd.Y Here, the Court
specifically addressed the appropriate criteria for successorship. Howard
Johnson had purchased the assets of a restaurant and motor lodge from its
franchisee. 4 Their agreement specified that Howard Johnson would not
assume any labor obligations nor recognize any labor agreement.8s Prior to
the sale, the fifty-three employees of the restaurant and motor lodge were
represented by the Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International
Union. 6 Their collective bargaining agreements contained successorship
provisions, providing that the agreement was binding upon the employer's
successors.
87
Two weeks before the transfer, the employees were notified of their
termination and Howard Johnson began to post hiring notices in the
restaurant and motor lodge. 8 However, when Howard Johnson began
operations with forty-five employees, only nine of them had been employed
by the predecessor.8 9
The union brought an action to compel arbitration under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act' to require Howard Johnson to hire
more of the previous employees. 91 The District Court held that both Howard
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 185.
83. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
84. Id. at 250. The franchisees entered into an agreement with Howard Johnson whereby
they sold them all of the personal property used in the operation of the restaurant and motor
lodge, while the franchisees retained ownership of the real property. Howard Johnson then leased
the land from the franchisees. Id. at 251.
85. Id.
86. Id. Officially the restaurant employees were represented by the Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders International Union, while the motor lodge employees were represented
by the Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employees Union. The two unions were both represented in
the litigation by the Detroit Local Joint Executive Board. Id. at 257 n.1.
87. Id. at 251.
88. Id. at 252. Howard Johnson also posted notices in local newspapers and other places.
Id.
89. Id. The nine employees were from the restaurant. Id. None of the motor lodge
employees were hired. Id.
90. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (1988).
91. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 252.
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Johnson and its predecessor were required to arbitrate the extent of their
obligations to the former employees. 2 However, the district court held that
Howard Johnson was not required to hire all of the predecessor's employ-
ees.
93
The Supreme Court reversed and refused to order arbitration, in part
because of a lack of substantial continuity in the identity of the workforce. 94
Because Howard Johnson had only hired nine of its predecessor's fifty-three
employees, the Court held that there was no continuity in the identity of the
workforce and thus no successorship obligations.95
The Court reaffirmed the continuity of identity in the business enterprise
requirement first stated in Wiley.9" Included in this requirement, and as a
prerequisite to the analysis, the Court held that there must be a substantial
continuity in the identity of the workforce throughout the change in
ownership. 7 In other words, the Court will first determine if there is a
majority of predecessor employees before considering any "continuity of
identity in the business enterprise" factors. The Court rationalized that this
was consistent with the Wiley Court's concern with protecting employees
during the transition period and avoiding the industrial strife.98 At the same
time, employers were relieved from the obligation to hire'any or all of their
92. Id. at 253.
93. Id. The company appealed the order to arbitrate and the Court of Appeals affirmed.Id.
94. Id. at 264. The existence of the successorship clause in the collective bargaining
agreement cannot bind the successor where there is not continuity. This is clear especially when
Howard Johnson refused to assume any obligations as part of its agreement. Id. at 258 n.3.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Id. Justice Douglas dissented, contending that the decisions in both Wiley and Burns
would require successorship status, citing both policy considerations and contract principles. Id.
at 265 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Although Wiley could not be bound to a contract he did not
sign, in spite of the strong policy favoring arbitration in this case, Howard Johnson was the
franchisor to the predecessor and exhibited substantial control over the business operation before
it took over. Id. at 267. For example, the motel franchise agreement provided that Howard
Johnson must determine and approve standards of construction, operation and service; that
Howard Johnson must approve any equipment or supplies bearing the name 'Howard Johnson';
that Howard Johnson would have first option to buy out the business; and that Howard Johnson
would have to approve any successor. Id. at 267 n.2. After the take-over, the business continued
as usual, under the same name, at the same location, offering the same products and services to
the same customers, with almost the same number of employees. Id. at 267. The only difference
was the identity of the employees. Id. According to Justice Douglas, the majority's decision
allows any new employer to determine whether or not to be obligated to the union, simply by
arranging for the termination of all the prior employer's personnel, regardless of any substantial
continuity of identity in the business enterprise factor. Id. at 269. This result is irreconcilable
with public policy decisions laid down in Wiley. Id. at 268.
97. Id. at 263.
98. Id. at 264.
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predecessor's employees,99 so long as union activity was not the basis for
the decision."°
The Court also distinguished this case from Wiley.' The lower courts
had held that Wiley controlled because both were section 301 actions, rather
than Burns, which involved an NLRB order."° The Court rejected this
assertion, disallowing the form of the union claim to determine the new
employer's rights. 0 3 Hence, successorship status was not found simply
because the claim was brought under section 301, rather than under an unfair
labor practice charge.
Furthermore, the Court found significant differences between this case
and Wiley. First, Wiley involved a merger in which the predecessor
employer completely disappeared."° Because of the disappearance of the
original entity, the union would be without remedy unless successorship was
found. 10 Second, Wiley was conducted in a state following a rule that a
surviving corporation, after a merger, is held liable for the obligations of the
disappearing corporation.105 Thus state law alerted Wiley as to its possible
liability, whereas Howard Johnson, decided in a state without such a law,
was not.
After Howard Johnson, successorship cases were decided based on two
questions: (1) whether a majority of the new company's employees were
former employees of its predecessor;" and (2) whether there was "substan-
tial continuity of identity in the business enterprise. 0 The Board developed
criteria for determining the second question: (1) whether there was
substantial continuity of the same business operations; (2) whether the same
plant was used; (3) whether the same or substantially the same work force
was employed; (4) whether the same jobs existed under the same working
conditions; (5) whether the same machinery, equipment and methods of
production were used; (6) whether the same product was manufactured or the
same services offered; and (7) whether the same supervisors are employed.'°9
99. Id. "This holding is compelled ... if the protection afforded employee interests in a
change of ownership by Wiley is to be reconciled with the new employer's right to operate the
enterprise with his own independent labor force." Id.
100. Id. at 262 n.8. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in either
the hiring or retention of any employee based on union membership or activity. 29 U.S.C.A. §
158 (8)(a)(3) (1988).
101. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 256.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 257. Here, the predecessor employer remained as the lessor of the property. Id.
at 251.
105. Id. at 257.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 263.
108. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964).
109. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.RtB. 234, 236 (1972).
[V/ol. 32
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5. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB
In cases subsequent to Howard Johnson, the Board only found successor
liability in cases where a majority of the new employer's work force had
been employed by the predecessor."10 Thus, it seemed that a majority of the
new employer's employees had to be former employees of the predecessor
before the factors for business continuity would be applied."' In Fall River,
thirteen years after Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court finally clarified the
test for successorship and the duty to bargain."'
The predecessor company in Fall River, Sterlingwale, operated a textile
dyeing and finishing plant in which the production and maintenance
employees were represented by the United Textile Workers of America
(UTWA). 1 3 Business declined and eventually all production employees were
laid off."' Sterlingwale then went out of business about six months
later."' The real property and equipment were assigned to creditors, while
the inventory was sold at auction."16
Meanwhile, Sterlingwale's former vice-president in charge of sales
formed a partnership with the president of one of Sterlingwale's major
customers. They formed Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corporation with
the intention of taking advantage of Sterlingwale's assets and work force." 7
Seven months after the final lay-offs, in September 1992, Fall River
began operating out of Sterlingwale's former facilities and began to hire
employees." 8 Out of twelve supervisors initially hired, eight were former
Sterlingwale supervisors and three were former Sterlingwale production
employees. 1"9
In October, 1982, UTWA requested Fall River to recognize it as the
bargaining agent and to begin collective bargaining. However, Fall River
110. George, supra note 21, at 287.
111. Id.
112. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
113. Id. at 30-31.
114. Id. at 31. The most recent collective bargaining agreement was due to expire at about
the same time that business began to decline. In response to the company's financial difficulties,
the union agreed to extend the expiration date of its contract by one year without any wage
increase and also agreed to improve productivity. Id.
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id.
117. Id. The customer acquired the plant, real property and equipment from Sterlingwale's
creditors and in turn, conveyed the property to the new corporation. The corporation also
obtained some of Sterlingwale's remaining inventory at the auction. Id.
118. Id. Fall River advertised for employees in the newspaper and the vice-president
personally contacted several prospective supervisors. Id. at 33.
119. Id. Fail River hoped to hire one full shift of workers, 55 to 66 employees, and then
expand to a second shift as business permitted. The start-up employees spent four to six weeks
in start-up operations and an additional month in experimental production. Id.
1995]
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refused this request. 120 In November, 1982, the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges against Fall River for its refusal to bargain with the
union. 12
The Administrative Law Judge (AUL') decided that Fall River was a
successor to Sterlingwale and it had an obligation to bargain with the union
because a majority of its employees were former Sterlingwale employ-
ees.'1 The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision and the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit enforced."
The Supreme Court on appeal considered four issues in Fall River: (1)
whether Burns was limited to circumstances involving recent certification of
the union; (2) whether Fall River was a successor to Sterlingwale; (3)
whether the Board's "substantial and representative complement" rule fixing
the moment to determine whether a majority of the successor's employees are
former employees of the predecessor, was reasonable; and (4) whether the
Board's "continuing demand" rule was reasonable. 124
In response to the first issue, the Court agreed with the Board and Court
of Appeals decisions that the Burns holding would be equally applicable
where a union had not been recently certified before a transition in
employers. 23 Mere change in ownership would not affect Board certifica-
tion where, after a change in ownership, a majority of the employees were
previously employed by the preceding employer. 23
120. Id. At the time, Fall River employed 21 employees, 18 of them former Sterlingwale
workers. Id.
121. Id. at 34. The union claimed that Fall River violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA.
29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1988). The statute reads in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any employer-(I) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Id.
122. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 34. The ALJ determined that the proper date for making this
determination was in mid-January, when Fall River had obtained a "representative complement"
of employees, not in mid-April when the "full complement" of employees was hired. Id.
Although the union's demand for bargaining occurred two months before this date, the demand
was characterized as "of a continuing nature" which would take effect when the representative
complement was reached. Because former Sterlingwale employees were in the majority in mid-
January and the union's October demand was still in effect, the duty to bargain arose in mid-
January and Fall River's refusal constituted an unfair labor practice. Id. at 35.
123. Id. The Court acknowledged the Board's substantial and representative complement
standard as an attempt to determine when a successor has to bargain with the predecessor's union
during a transition period when it may not be clear when the new employer will reach a full
complement of employees. Id.
124. Id. at 29-30.
125. Id. at 37. See NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1960);
Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 1969).
126. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 37.
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The Court cited the Board in identifying two presumptions regarding a
union's majority status following certification. 7 For one year following
certification, the Court held that the union is entitled to an irrebuttable
presumption of majority support." After the first year, the employer can
rebut the presumption by establishing a good faith doubt regarding continuing
union support.'29 The Court derived these presumptions from the NLRA's
overriding policy of promoting industrial peace, not from any certainty that
the union's majority status will remain.13 This removes the temptation of
the employer to delay bargaining in hopes of undermining union support.''
Moreover, this policy allows unions to pursue the goals of their members,
and this in turn will promote industrial peace. 32
The Court expressed deep concern with the position of the employees in
the successorship situation. It reasoned that if the employees were employed
by a new enterprise that was substantially the same as the old, they might
begin to feel that their choice of unions was subject to marketplace
manipulations.' 33 Moreover, the employees might believe that union
support would jeopardize their job or blame the union for the change in
ownership, all of which would lead to industrial unrest.'34 Without the
presumptions, an employer could exploit the employees' ambivalent attitudes
toward the union, in order to completely eliminate its presence,135 while at
the same time, taking advantage of the trained worked force. 36
The Court next addressed the successor issue. The Board's criteria for
substantial continuity were adopted'37 with emphasis on "whether those
employees retained will understandably view their job situations as essentially
unchanged."' 38 Again, the NLRA policy of promoting industrial peace was
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 38.
130. Id. The Court did not base its decision from any certainty that the union's majority
status would remain indefinitely. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 38-39. During the unsettling transition period between employers, this
presumption is "particularly pertinent" to safeguard union members' rights as well as to develop
a relationship with a successor. Id. at 39.
133. Id. at 39-40.
134. Id at 40. This was true here, where some of Sterlingwale's employees complained of
the Union's inability to obtain benefits from the failing Sterlingwale. Id. at 40 n.7.
135. Id. at 40.
136. Id. at 41.
137. Id. at 43. The factors are: whether the business of both employers is essentially the
same; whether the employees of the new company are doing the same jobs in the same working
conditions under the same supervisors; and whether the new enterprise has the same production
process and produces the same products with basically the same customer base. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973)). The
seven month hiatus between the fall of Sterlingwale and the start-up of Fall River was but a
factor in the substantial continuity calculus, and thus was relevant only if there were other indicia
of discontinuity, which the Court did not find. Id. at 45. In fact, the Court noted that from the
employees' perspectives, the hiatus may have seemed like less than seven months, since during
1995]
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the foundation for the approach. 3 9  Additionally, the Court approved the
Board's findings that the duty to bargain arose when a representative
complement of employees were previously working for the predecessorbusiness. 141
Fall River claimed that this representative complement rule would burden
employers because of uncertainty of knowing when the bargaining obligation
will arise.' 4' The Court rejected this since the employer, as a successor, is
in the best position to know when it has begun normal production, which
triggers the "substantial and representative complement" rule. 42 More-
over, given the "expansionist dreams" of many new businesses, it would
prove equally, if not more difficult, to determine the moment when a "full
complement" of employees had been obtained.1
Finally, the Court held that the successor's duty to bargain at the
"substantial and representative complement" date must be triggered by a
union demand to bargain.144 The doctrine of successorship has evolved
through interpretation by the Board and the Supreme Court. If employees
retained by a successor employer view their job situation as essentially
unchanged from their previous employment, they can demand that the new
employer bargain with their previous union. This demand is considered
continuing until a representative complement is met. When a majority of the
new enterprise employees are from the predecessor employer, the new
employer has a duty to bargain with the existing collective bargaining unit,
however it is under no obligation to honor any provisions in the agreement.
that period, workers were interviewing and waiting for the new business to start up. Id. at 45-46.
139. Id. at 43. The Board again prevailed on the representative complement issue. The
Court approved the Board's attempt to balance the dual objectives of maximum employee
participation and immediate representation, and held that the representative complement of mid-
January was dispositive. Id. at 48-52.
140. Id. at 47. In determining when a substantial and representative complement of
employees exists, the Board looks at whether the job classifications were filled or substantially
filled and whether the operation was in normal or substantially normal production. It also
considers the size of the complement and the time expected to pass before a substantially larger
complement would be at work, as well as the relative certainty of expansion. Id. at 48. The
Court also cleared up some confusion on when to measure work force continuity. Some courts
had looked at whether a majority of the successor's employees were from the predecessor, while
others looked at when the successor hired a majority of the predecessor's employees. Id. at 47
n. 12. The Court adopted the former interpretation, that is, when the majority of the successor's
employees are former employees of the predecessor. Id. at 47.
141. Id. at 49.
142. Id. at 50.
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 52-53. By adopting the "continuing demand" rule, when a union has made a
premature bargaining demand, it will remain in force until the moment when the employer
reaches the "substantial and representative complement" of employees. Id. at 52. Because the
union cannot possibly know when a representative complement has been hired and the employer
does, it would not make sense to require the union to repeatedly demand recognition to coincide
with that moment. Id. at 53.
[Vol. 32
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II. NLRB DECISIONS
The courts have not yet faced the issue of whether a business can be a
successor to a public employee collective bargaining agreement. However,
the NLRB has specifically discussed the issue in three recent cases. These
cases are not only significant for their holdings, but also because they
demonstrate that federal courts give NLRB decisions great deference in
general. 45 Findings of fact by the Board are conclusive if, on the whole,
they are supported by substantial evidence on the record." The "Board's
application of the law to particular facts is also reviewed under the substantial
evidence standard, and the Board's reasonable inferences may not be
displaced on review even though the court might justifiably have reached a
different conclusion had it considered the matter de novo. "'47 The Courts
defer to the NLRB's determination as to facts and statutory interpretation
because the NLRA is a body of law the Board is entrusted with enforc-
ing.'4
8
The first case deciding whether a private business entity could be
considered a successor to a government employer involved the Army's
decision to contract out services at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.' 49  In
Base Services, the Army employed approximately 300-340 people in the
Directorate of Logistics service (DOL), 269 of whom were represented by
the union. 50 On June 1, 1988, Base Services took over the maintenance,
supply, transportation, and quality control functions previously performed in
the DOL.'51 At the time of the takeover, a majority of Base Service
employees previously worked for DOL, as employees of the Federal
Government. 152 However, out of the 239 employees working for Base
Services, only 109 were union employees.'53
The Board held that Base Services was not a successor employer to the
Army because at no time were a majority of Base Service's employees
previously represented by the union. 54  The Board did not mention any
145. NLRB v. Joe B. Foods, Inc., 953 F.2d 287, 291-92 (7th Cir. 1992).
146. U.S. Marine Corps. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1991). 29 U.S.C. §
160(e) provides jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to consider the Board's petition for
enforcement and also provides the standard of review.
147. Joe B. Foods, 953 F.2d at 291 (quoting Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 898
F.2d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 1990)).
148. Id. at 291-92.
149. Base Servs., Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 172 (1989).
150. Id.
151. Id. Three new, small departments were created in addition. They were contract
administration, employee relations and accounting. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Forty-six percent.
154. Id. at 173. The Board looked at the employees as a whole and also according to
groups and reached the same conclusion. In the maintenance and supply area, only 77 (39%) of
the 196 total maintenance and supply employees were for DOL union employees. Likewise in
a unit comprised of maintenance, supply, transportation and quality control employees, only 108
1995]
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problem with applying the NLRA to former public employees not previously
covered by the Act. 55
One year later the Board reached a similar conclusion in Harbert
International Services.'56 The union represented 763 Army employees at
Fort Leonard Wood, 219 of whom worked within the Directorate of
Engineering (DEH).1'7 Harbert International Services took over the DEH
functions on June 1, 1988.158 At the time of the take-over, Harbert
employed 142 employees, seventy-two of whom previously worked for DEH
and seventy of whom did not." 9 In dispute were fourteen employees, who
were either temporary or supervisory employees. 60
The Board agreed with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in finding
that employees who were temporary employees in the predecessor's unit and
were permanently hired by the successor should be counted for successorship
determination. 6' Even with the addition of these workers, only seventy-
five of the 151 employees were former union employees from DEH and thus
did not constitute the majority needed to find successorship status. 62
Thus in both Base Services and Harbert, the reasons for denying
successorship status were not because the former employer was the United
States Government, but rather because the former employees did not
constitute a majority at the new enterprise. As Administrative Law Judge
Cates concluded in Base Services, "[t]he Board is not precluded from finding
that successorship status exists simply because the predecessor was not
covered by the Act."'63
(43%) of the 253 total employees were previously represented by the union. Id.
155. Id. at 172-73.
156. Harbert Int'l Servs., 296 N.L.R.B. 472 (1989).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. A labor relations specialist testified that temporary employees were hired for a
definite period of time, usually from one year. This employment could be extended in one year
increments, for up to four years. Therefore, according to the ALJ, the four temporary employees
had no definite termination dates. Furthermore, the absence of a job offer acceptance/refusal
form did not preclude a temporary employee from being counted. Id. at 472-73.
162. Id. at 473.
163. Base Servs., 296 N.L.R.B. at 175. The ALJ continued
I am persuaded the traditional successorship test is the proper one to be applied in the
instant case notwithstanding the fact the predecessor-the Army-was not an employer
within the meaning of the Act. Imposing successorship in the instant situation fulfills
the purposes of the Act by fostering stability and harmony in labor relations for an
employer (Base) who is covered by the Act and which renders services to a customer
(the Army) that directly affects national defense. To fail to apply the traditional
successorship test in the instant case, merely because the predecessor was from the
public sector, would place form over the substantive goals of the Act.
Id. at 177. The Board reversed the AL's decision only because a majority of the predecessor's
employees were not hired by Base Services and did not address the public/private issue. Id.
[Vol. 32
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Recently, in JMM Operational Services, the Board looked at a privatized
municipal service: the operation of wastewater treatment plants. 16 The
city of Pekin, Illinois, decided to contract out its wastewater treatment
facility to a private entity, JMM Operational Services. 65 The International
Order of Teamsters had been the exclusive bargaining representative for
Pekin's wastewater treatment employees for more than twenty years. 6
When the city decided to privatize, four out of the five former city
employees were hired by JMM. 67
JMM refused to bargain with the City's union claiming that a private
employer cannot be a successor to a public employer. 16  The Board
disagreed and followed the successorship test articulated in Fall River and
Burns.169  Again this test was imposed from the employees' perspectives,
that is, whether their job situation had been altered such that they would
change their attitudes about being represented. 70 Although some changes
in operation were instituted when the operation was privatized, the Board
determined that they were not substantial enough to affect employees'
attitudes about being represented by the union and thus, JMM was a
successor employer to the city of Pekin.'
It is important that the Board thought insignificant JMM's claim that
successor status could not be imposed where the predecessor was a public
entity. The Board relied on the AL's reasoning in Base Services and
164. JMM Operational Servs., 1995 WL 25493 (June 20, 1995)
165. Id. at 3. The City of Pekin retained ownership of the wastewater treatment facilities
and equipment. Id.
166. Id. at *2.
167. Id. at *3. The City employees were employees as defined by the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (ILL. REV. STAT. 1989). Id. at *8. The statute covers individuals who work for
either state, county or municipal employers. The city was also subject to the Act's rulings. The
Illinois State Labor Relations Board (ISLRB) has jurisdiction over collective bargaining between
the union and the units of local government. The ISLRB's purpose and policies are consistent
with those of the NLRB. Id.
168. Id. at *10. The Union argued that it had represented various units of employees in
state proceedings when their municipal employers privatized operations. Id. at *8. The ALJ
ruled that the State Board's recognition of a lawful bargaining history should be acknowledged.
Id. This conforms with the Board's longstanding policy of recognizing state agency proceedings
where those proceedings are free of gross due process violations. Id.
169. Id. at *12.
It is settled law under the Board and court's traditional test that when a new employer
takes over the business of a formerly unionized operation and does so with a
substantial and representative complement of bargaining unit employees, a majority
of whom had been similarly employed by the predecessor, the new employer will be
considered a "successor employer" and will inherit certain of the predecessor's
bargaining obligations. The obligations the successor inherits include recognizing and
bargaining in good faith with the union but does not bind it to the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement with the union.
Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *13. A mere change in ownership alone would not be sufficient unless there
were an essential change in working conditions. Id. at * 12.
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decided that the emphasis in successorship cases must be placed on whether
there is continuity of the enterprise rather than the source of the employ-
ment. 72
Another recent Board case further supports the assertion of NLRB
jurisdiction in cases where the Federal government contracts-out servic-
es. 17 Previously, if an employer lacked sufficient control over employ-
ment decisions, it was deemed unable to effectively bargain with a labor
organization, and thus the Board would decline jurisdiction.174  For
instance, if government contracted-out a service, but retained sufficient
control over salaries or other economic conditions, the Board would not have
jurisdiction and thus could not decide successorship issues.
In Management Training Corporation,75 the Board explicitly overruled
previous precedent and held that a federally-funded job corp training program
was subject to the NLRB. Iv6 The employer in Management Training
Corporation operated a job corp facility pursuant to a contract with the
United States Department of Labor (DOL).'7 In contract proposals, the
DOL required information regarding salary structure and assurances of
conformance to prevailing wage rates and benefits.' In addition, once the
contract was awarded, any proposed changes in salary, personnel policies or
employee benefits had to be approved by the DOL. 179 Under previous
Board precedent, 8' because the employer lacked the final say concerning
these primary economic aspects of its relationship with the employees, it was
effectively precluded from bargaining with a union and thus would be outside
the jurisdiction of the NLRB.I'
The Board in Management Training Corporation declined to analyze the
amount of control retained by the government and instead announced a new
test to determine whether it should assert jurisdiction. Now the Board will
consider only two factors: (1) whether the employer meets the definition of
172. Id.
173. Management Training Corp., 1995 LEXIS 710 (July 28, 1995).
174. Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 670 (1986).
175. Management Training Corp., 1995 LEXIS 710.
176. Id. at *12-*20.
177. Id. at *3. The Clearfield Job Corps Center was a federally funded employment and
training program providing job training to economically disadvantaged individuals, authorized
by the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1791 (1995)).
178. Id. at *4. According to testimony, potential employers had to include the following
in their contract proposals: (1) job classifications, labor-grade and salary scales showing the
minimum and maximum wages for each grade; (2) personnel policies regarding compensatory
time, overtime, severance pay, holidays, vacations, sick leave, raises, probationary employment
and equal employment opportunity. Id. In addition, the employers were required to follow
DOL policies regarding hiring, firing, promotion, demotion and transfer of all employees. Id.
at *5.
179. Id at *4. The DOL could deny reimbursement in excess of the contractual amount.
Id. at *5.
180. Res-Care Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 670, at 683 (1986).
181. Id. at 674.
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"employer" under the NLRA,In and (2) whether the employer meets
applicable monetary jurisdictional requirements. 83 In making this decision,
the Board stressed that "without question, an employer's voluntary decision
to contract away some of its authority over terms and conditions of
employment should not be determinative of the Board's jurisdiction."'"
In fact, the dissent conceived of the case where a "governmental agency
controls all economic terms and most of the noneconomic terms, and the
employer controls only a handful of noneconomic terms" would be subject
to NLRB jurisdiction.s
Because the courts usually will defer to NLRB decisions,"8 6 it is likely
they will follow the Board's reasoning in deciding successorship of formerly
government employers, even when the government retains control of
economic conditions. Accordingly, the public/private distinction may
become irrelevant for successorship purposes and those businesses that take
over former governmental enterprises may have a duty to bargain with their
predecessor's collective bargaining unit."7
The decision to assert or decline jurisdiction lies within the discretion of
the Board.'88 The burden is on the employer to persuade the Board not to
exercise its jurisdiction.'89 Additionally, the Board's findings of fact will
be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record.'
Thus, the burden of showing sufficient control to eliminate the duty of a
successor to bargain is difficult to overcome.
However, a savvy employer can bypass these obstacles and refuse to hire
the predecessor's union employees in an effort to avoid a collective
bargaining obligation. Refusal to hire based on union membership, is a
182. Management Training, 1995 LEXIS 710, at *20. Section 2(2) of the Act specifically
excludes the Federal and state governments from the definition of "employer." Additionally,
"political subdivisions" of governmental entities are also excluded. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
183. See GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, A GUIDE To BASIC LAW AND PROCEDURES UNDER
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1991). The Board limits its exercise of power to
enterprises substantially affecting commerce. Id. at 43. Consequently it sets standards based on
the yearly amount of sales, purchases or business and distinguishes between different types of
businesses. Id. at 43-45.
184. Management Training, 1995 LEXIS 710, at *22.
185. Id. at *31 (Cohen, dissenting).
186. NLRB v. Joe B. Foods, 953 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1992).
187. See Mansfield Volunteer Fire Co., 316 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (Jan. 31, 1995). In an
advisory opinion, the Board declined to consider whether the NLRB had jurisdiction over a
private, non-profit corporation funded primarily through the town with which it has contracted
to perform fire-protection services. Instead, the Board's only inquiry was whether the employer
satisfied the Board's monetary standards for asserting jurisdiction.
188. NLRB v. Parents & Friends of the Specialized Living Ctr., 879 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th
Cir. 1989).
189. Human Development Ass'n v. NLRB, 937 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
190. U.S. Marine Corps. v NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1991).
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violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA. 19' Successorship will
be found if, but for the discriminatory refusal to hire, the union would have
maintained the majority status required." However, the discharged
workers must make out an extraordinarily stringent case 93 by showing
direct and substantial evidence of anti-union sentiment."9 Even if an
employee shows union discrimination, the penalty for the offender is only
reinstatement with back pay, less interim earnings. 95 As a result, this
remedy may be insufficient to protect union workers. In an attempt to
protect workers and their jobs, a state may enact a successorship statute,
however the statute may be preempted by Federal law and thereby be found
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.'96 Thus union workers may
be left at the mercy of employers even if the successorship doctrine is
applied.
191. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) (1988) reads: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7 (section 157 of this title)." Id. Section 158(a)(3) reads in part: ". . . by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
192. Love's Barbecue Restaurant No. 62, 245 N.L.R.B. 78 (1979), enforced sub nom.
Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981).
193. Dasal Caring Ctrs., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 60, 69 (1986), enforced, 815 F.2d 711 (6th Cir.
1987). To show discrimination in hiring to avoid union obligations
it must be established that there is substantial evidence of union animus; lack of a
convincing rationale for refusal to hire the predecessor's employees; inconsistent
hiring practices or overt acts or conduct evidencing a discriminatory motive; as well
as a reasonable inference from the evidence that [the successor] conducted its staffing
in a manner precluding the predecessor's employees from being hired as a majority
of [the successor's] overall work force to avoid the Board's successorship doctrine.
Id.
194. Id. For example, a mass termination of predecessor employees is not sufficient to show
discrimination. Wilson McLeod, Rekindling Labor Law Successorship in an Era of Decline, 11
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 271, 297-98 (1994).
195. Id.
196. United Steelworkers of Am. v. St. Gabriel's Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 335 (D. Minn. 1994).
Two preemption doctrines define the scope of the NLRA. The first, "Garmon preemption",
prohibits state regulation of activities protected by section 7 of the NLRA or constitute an unfair
abor practice under section 8. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959). Within this rule are two exceptions, the first allows states to regulate activity which is
only a peripheral concern of the NLRA. United Steelworkers, 871 F. Supp. at 340. The second
allows conduct which touches interests rooted in local feeling that, in the absence of compelling
congressional direction, could not infer that Congress had deprived the states the power to act.
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 (1986). The secondpreemption principle, "Machinists preemption prohibits state regulation of areas that Congressintended to be controlled by the free play of economic forces. Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 1 40 (1976). The Minnesota district court found
both principles applied. Id. at 341-42.
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss1/7
SUCCESSORSHIP IN PRIVATIZATION
III. SUCCESSORSHIP AND PRIVATIZATION
A. Positive Effects of Unionization
Consistent throughout the Court's and the Board's treatment of the
successorship issue is the overriding concern for the preservation of industrial
peace, viewed from the employees' perspectives. According to the NLRA,
inequality of bargaining power not only leads to labor unrest, but tends to
aggravate business depressions, by reducing wages, thereby decreasing the
purchasing power of workers."9
The Act recognizes that employees that are paid decent wages and
receive adequate benefits, are employees that can purchase other goods and
services, thus encouraging interstate commerce.' 98 The ability to bargain
collectively safeguards and promotes commerce by removing recognized
sources of industrial strife and promoting practices essential to the friendly
adjustment of disputes. "
As a result of these policies, union workers have made strides that their
non-union counterparts have not.' For instance, union workers receive
higher pay, obtain better benefits and have greater job security than their
non-union counterparts. 20 Moreover, unions have attempted to equalize
pay between the sexes. 2  Because of this, union workers may be better
able to purchase homes, go on vacations and the like, all of which contribute
to the economy.
Additionally, there is some evidence that union workers are more likely to
vote and are more active politically than non-union workers.0 3 Unions are
able to exact concessions from political constituents as well as from
employers.' Unions exert this influence because of their size and
solidarity of membership and through lobbying and political contribu-
tions. 205
This "empowerment" has a marked effect on worker effectiveness and
worker motivation." Unionization produces efficiency through the
creation of a formalized and effective "voice" for employees, which allows
them to express shared concerns and individual grievances, and to seek their
197. 29 U.S.C.A § 151 (1988).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
(1984).
201. Al Bilik, Privatization: Defacing the Community, 43 LABOR L.J. 338, 339 (1992).
202. ROBERT HEBDON, THE PERILS OF PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FOR NEW YORK STATE
30 (1994).
203. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 200, at 192-93.
204. HEBON, supra note 202, at 14.
205. Id.
206. Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding
the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEx. L. REV. 921, 956 (1993).
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resolution.107 Because of the effectiveness of their voice in union activities,
unionized workers may be more likely to use their "voice" on a national
level.
Likewise, studies find that unions are associated with higher productivity
than nonunions. 8 Unions reduce the threat of retaliation that an individual
employee would face for complaints against the management, especially
regarding such "public goods" as workplace safety.' These across-the-
board workplace regulations are better enforced in unionized workplaces,
since there is a body with more resources, experience and protection from
retribution than any individual employee would have.210
Unions also promote efficiency in production.2" Because unions are
able to secure higher wages and benefits, rewards for seniority, training
programs, limitations on the power to discharge, and mechanisms for
redressing grievances and seeking improvements, employees have greater
security and a greater stake in the enterprise.2 2 As a result, there may be
less employee turnover and an increased willingness to train new employees
and encourage communication between employees and management, which
in turn can lead to greater efficiency and quality in production.2"3
These benefits of union organization are obviously good for both the
union employee and society in general. The application of successorship
doctrine to privatized industries will ensure that these benefits continue.
B. Consequences of Privatization
The most obvious consequences of privatization without successorship
are the loss of union jobs and lower wages.2 4 Public sector contracting-
out has tended to emphasize hiring of temporary and part-time workers, in
207. HEBDON, supra note 202, at 15.
208. Id. For example, unions may promote efficiency within the firm by forcing
management to reduce organizational slack, institute personnel policies and monitor employees
and supervisors. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 957.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 958.
213. Id.
[A]s long as management regards employees as expendable factors of production, and
gives them no real voice in the governance of the enterprise, employees willjustifiably regard every technological improvement, every improvement in efficiency,
every change in the direction of the enterprise as a potential threat to their livelihood.
Employees will be loath to communicate ways to make their jobs more efficient, or
even to eliminate them, if they perceive that to do so may endanger their continued
employment.
Id. at 960.
214. Bilik, supra note 201, at 339.
[Vol. 32
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part, to circumvent paying higher wages and benefits.215 Consequently,
contractors pay lower wages and benefits, provide fewer vacations and days
for sick leave and make extensive use of part-time, temporary or less-skilled
personnel. 216 Accordingly, the quality of service declines when there is no
commitment between employer and employee. 217  Any decline in quality
of service can have drastic consequences especially in service-oriented
industries, such as the post office or medical services.
The quality and the quantity of non-union jobs has been steadily
declining.2"8 One third of all American workers and one fifth of full-time,
year-round workers, now receive poverty level wages.2 19 Concurrently,
the number of part-time workers has increased substantially.' A dispro-
portionate number of these workers are female and/or Black." These
part-time employees are less likely to receive health benefits or retirement
benefits from their employers.' 2 This may result in profit for the busi-
ness, but also cuts comers on quality and places a large burden on the
employees, who cannot afford these benefits on their own. 3
Because wages and jobs are cut, taxpayers must shoulder new expenses,
such as unemployment compensation and public health services for those who
have lost their employment and benefits. 4  In effect, the privatized
business is passing many of the costs of doing business onto the taxpayer, all
in the name of profit for itself.?
Social goals, such as employment of minorities, women and the
handicapped may also be undermined by privatization.' In the public
sector, federal, state and local governments must provide employment
opportunities to minorities. 7  But when public jobs are privatized, these
are usually the first to go.? With privatization, private employers would
not be accountable to the government for their hiring and firing practices.
Consequently, more minorities and women may find themselves both without
employment and without recourse.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. McLeod, supra note 194, at 282-83.
219. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF
LEISURE 150 (1991).
220. McLeod, supra note 194, at 284.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Bilik, supra note 201, at 340.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 340-41.
226. Id. at 341.
227. Id.
228. Id. For example, in 1983 in Los Angeles County, Blacks and Chicanos experience
more than 90% of the layoffs that resulted from privatization, although they only represented
47% of the workforce. Id.
1995]
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Constitutional rights granted to protect citizens from governmental
intrusion and exclusion do not apply to private employers.2 9 When a
government service is privatized, a private source may decide who receives
services without due process considerations." ° The private business would
decide whom it would serve, when it would serve, and for how much. For
example, if the post office were privatized, the new private postal business
could charge more for mail service in dangerous neighborhoods or stop
service altogether, and yet be shielded from due process claims.
In addition, employees may lose the freedom of speech protections
necessary for whistleblowing. 11 If an employer is free to terminate any
employee at will, employees will be less likely to complain when something
is wrong, for fear of losing their jobs. Consequently, dangerous or illegal
acts of an employer may go unreported.
The problem of social accountability argues against privatization. 
2
Service arrangements should be evaluated in terms of their faithfulness to
"public values," in other words, how things are produced, or the equitable-
ness of how they are distributed, or the pay, benefits or working conditions
of those producing them.3 3 Privatization proponents tend to look only at
the cost of the item or service and not the public value of it.' 4 If the
bottom line is always cost, without regard to these public values, what does
that say about us as a society?
Another problem with privatizing public functions is the inevitable
weakening in the lines of political accountability.s Government decision-
making capacity is transferred to for-profit and not-for-profit corporations for
which the government can exert little control? 6 This can result in a threat
to public order and safety,' 1 as well as corruption. 8 When there is no
one overseeing the employer and little or no recourse for wrongdoing, the
temptation for the employer to become all-powerful is great. Consequently,
for the employee to be heard he or she would have to resort to drastic
measures, such as civil unrest or slacking off. Thus, privatization may
detrimentally affect society as a whole if it means loss of union representa-
tion. Proponents fail to consider these effects or minimize them by
concentrating on perceived cost savings only. These social aspects must be
229. HEBDON, supra note 202, at 19.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 15.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 18 (explaining Ronald Moe, Exploring the Limits of Privatization, in PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 453-60 (1987)).
236. Il
237. Id. As an example the author cites the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Id.
238. Id. at 19.
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considered in the decision to privatize any government enterprise and bolster
support for the application of successorship doctrine.
C. Expansion of Successorship Doctrine
In order to preserve and maintain the benefits the union workers have
achieved as well as promote the goals of the National Labor Relations Act,
more safeguards should be given to union employees facing privatization.
The application of the doctrine of successorship is a beginning. However,
even if the new employer recognizes its duty to bargain, it is under no
obligation to honor the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 9
Requiring a successor employer to take over an existing bargaining
agreement as part of the privatization contract may be a solution. The
private enterprise, in deciding to bid on a government contract, must analyze
many factors, such as costs of equipment and estimates of future profit. The
identity of a collective bargaining unit and the costs incurred by it, would be
just one more factor in their analysis.
Another problem with current successorship law is that the employer
essentially decides if it is to become a successor. By simply not hiring any
of the previous entity's unionized workers, it can avoid any successorship
obligations. Moreover, the remedy for such union discrimination in hiring
imposed by the NLRA is weak and difficult to prove.2' In order to rectify
this, the penalties for anti-union discrimination should be made harsher. By
imposing more expensive monetary penalties, the successor employer may
find it less cost-beneficial to refuse to hire union employees.
These proposals for increased worker protection also work to the
employer's advantage. The former government employees have experience
and knowledge in their particular fields which can be particularly useful for
the new employer. Many of the industries considering privatization are
highly specialized and technical. The private employer can save training
costs and other start-up costs by hiring its predecessor's employees.
Society in general benefits when union workers are protected as well.
Less unemployment means less people requiring public welfare. It also
means more people with expendable income, which in turn benefits
businesses and the general public. Finally, studies have shown that union
members are more productive and politically active than their non-union
counterparts, all of which we as a society should be striving to promote.
CONCLUSION
Privatization is increasingly mentioned as a partial solution to the ever-
increasing federal budget and is being proposed on a potentially large scale.
239. NLRB v. Bums Int'l See. Sys., 406 U.S. 272, 276 (1972).
240. McLeod, supra note 194, at 247.
1995]
27
Gee: The Application of the Doctrine of Successorship to the Privatiza
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
It has been suggested as a way to reduce government spending at the
national, state and local levels while at the same time increasing efficiency
and effectiveness.
Although advocates claim that it will shrink the size and bureaucracy of
government, one outcome of this reduction in government is the loss of jobs,
many of which are held by workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements. These workers may be laid off by their governmental employer
and then rehired by the private operator in essentially the same capacity,
potentially without their union benefits.
Current labor successorship law obligates an employer to recognize the
union only when the successor has hired a substantial complement of workers
from the predecessor's company.24 Therefore, a private company could
avoid any collective bargaining obligations simply by not hiring union
employees.
Although the NLRB has the authority to bring an unfair labor practice
suit against the successor for refusal to hire based on union membership,242
this remedy may be insufficient to protect unions and their employees.243
The potentially large scale in which privatization is proposed demands a
more effective remedy to protect workers, who would otherwise be
unemployed and unemployable in their fields. These workers may inevitably
have to settle for minimum wage work or end up on public assistance.
Legislation on the national level seems most plausible, because state
legislation would be prone to preemption by the NLRA or LMRA.24 In
that way, the NLRA goal of industrial peace will be sustained, while at the
same time, a more productive, benevolent and democratic economy will be
promoted.
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